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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Without a deliberate policy of mainstreaming socio-economic rights, South 
Africa may have to retrace some of its failed practices.  The practice of apartheid 
was brought into sharp relief in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
hearings where the compelling testimony illustrated how the majority were 
regularly (mis)treated in their quest to be regarded as ordinary human beings.  
While this was not the first occasion when the victims raised their concerns about 
their plight, the television broadcasts starkly unraveled their sufferings into the 
living rooms of every household. 
With every anniversary of the new South Africa, questions are inevitably 
asked about how far it has come in terms of transformation as a new nation under 
the new dispensation.  However, is the effluxion of twenty-two years an 
appropriate time to reflect on the maturity of South African democracy?  Once, 
twenty-one years was regarded as rite of passage for adulthood.  Some may 
therefore find this inappropriate in the history of any state, including the apartheid 
state, because twenty-two years is insufficient time to ameliorate centuries of 
socio-economic oppression of the majority.  At the same time, one cannot ignore 
recent social events as possible indicators of the impatience of South African 
society. 
The idea of transitional justice has gained momentum in the last two or so 
decades, even though its boundaries as a distinct discipline have yet to fully 
crystalize.  The idea of transitional justice has gained momentum in the last two 
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or so decades, even though its boundaries as a distinct discipline have yet to fully 
crystalize.  The waves of transition that spread through many countries in the last 
few decades, whether from violent conflicts—Northern Ireland, Liberia, 
Guatemala, Colombia, and South Africa, as examples—or brutal dictatorships—
Chile and Argentina—have brought the experiences of these different countries 
into sharper focus, and scholars have pored over the details of how the various 
countries managed the processes1 for their respective countries.  The Colombian 
example of Victims Law—with its emphasis on the restitution of land as a 
cardinal aspect of transitional justice—is a more recent example of a defined 
focus on an essential socio-economic right for that country.2 
The use of transitional justice mechanisms has increased around the world, 
though with varying degrees of success.3  Right from the Nuremberg Trials to the 
proliferation of international criminal tribunals since the 1990s, transitional 
justice has focused on violations of civil and political rights with the emphasis on 
criminal prosecutions and accountability in societies emerging from conflicts, but 
it has discountenanced the debilitating effects of socio-economic 
disempowerment occasioned by past structural injustices.4  One commentator 
summarized the concern in the following language: 
 
Prosecution and punishment are important components of 
justice, but they are only post hoc interventions.  Justice 
encompasses the truth, reform of state institutions, reparation for 
victims and creative initiatives to forge reconciliation.  Courts 
are crucially important in combating impunity, but we dare not 
confine the struggle for human rights to one set of institutions or 
one approach to deal with the past.5 
 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established 
with a focus on violations of human rights that occurred since March 1, 1960.6  
The Commission interpreted its mandate to exclude social and economic rights 
violations such as those arising from forced removals and discrimination in 
education and employment opportunities.7  A more appropriate cut-off date might 
have been 1913, when the Natives Land Rights Act was enacted and began a 
 
1 See, e.g., Alexander L. Boraine, Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation, 60 J. OF INT’L AFF. 
17 (2006) (citing 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER 
REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., United States Institute of Peace Press 1995)). 
2 See Nicole Summers, Note, Columbia Victims’ Law: Transitional Justice in a Time of Violent 
Conflict?, 25 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 219, 220, 225–26 (2012). 
3 Makau Mutua, What is the Future of Transitional Justice?, 9 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1 
(2015). 
4 See Thomas Bundschuh, Enabling Transitional Justice, Restoring Capabilities: The Imperative of 
Participation and Normative Integrity, 9 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 10, 11 (2015); see also Louise 
Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3, 5 
(2007). 
5 See Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. OF INT’L AFF. 647, 667 (1999). 
6 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.). 
7 See Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Vol. 5, Chap. 1, ¶ 48 
(1998); see also Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, supra note 6, at § 3(1)(a). 
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systemic and institutionalized dispossession of Black South Africans of their 
lands.  In most other parts of the world where transitional justice was 
implemented, it was perhaps less difficult to investigate the atrocities of the past 
than to craft and implement a program of action for socio-economic rights as a 
remedial measure.  In South Africa, the criminal justice system was unlikely to 
deliver convictions at that time due to the difficulties of unearthing the evidence, 
the high time and cost factors and an inefficient criminal justice system.8 
Transitional justice has since expanded in scope and contents, and some 
people now challenge the rationale for excluding economic, social, and cultural 
rights in such transitional justice processes.9  Paul Gready has already drawn 
attention to the importance of the realization of socio-economic rights in his 
assessment of the work of transitional justice10 in South Africa, but he is cautious 
about what can be achieved.  It is against this background that this article revisits 
experiences in South Africa without the intention of apportioning all the blame 
for the lack of—or limited success of—South Africa’s socio-economic 
transformation onto the transitional justice process where these concerns were 
also raised. 
 
 
I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION 
 
 
It is significant that when asked about what form of reparation they wanted, 
most victims in the South African Truth and Reconciliation were concerned about 
the truth as it related to the loss of their loved ones and the reasons for their death.  
Alex Boraine also noted: 
 
Others talked about the possibility of assistance in education, or, 
because of ill health, some guarantee of treatment for physical, 
mental, and spiritual problems.  Some of course talked about 
money in order to repair housing or to assist them generally, 
because many of them were unemployed.11 
 
David Backer found that almost all participants wanted financial 
contributions, 98%, as well as jobs, housing and education, 91%.12  These 
requests are examples of the classical socioeconomic right to an adequate 
standard of living as envisaged in Article 11 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  When the Interim Constitution in South 
 
8 Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 651–53. 
9 See Ismael Muvingi, Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socio-economic Rights in Transitional Societies, 3 
INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 163, 163–182 (2009). 
10 PAUL GREADY, THE ERA OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BEYOND 211 (2011). 
11 ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION 334 (2000); see also JUAN CARLOS OCHOA S., THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCEEDINGS FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 184 (2013). 
12 David Backer, Victims’ Responses to Truth Commissions: Evidence from South Africa, in 
SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION: WHEN THE WARS END 179 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2007). 
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Africa was replaced by the Constitution of 1996, many of these rights contained 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights found 
their way, not coincidentally, into that Constitution.  Some writers refer to such 
socioeconomic rights as issues of development and, therefore, take an economics 
approach—not a human rights approach.  But, Amartya Sen has reminded us that, 
“liberty of political participation or the opportunity to receive basic education or 
health care . . . are among the constituent components of development . . . [and] 
these freedoms and rights are also very effective in contributing to economic 
progress.”13  Therefore, a human rights approach, which is taken in this article, is 
not misplaced. 
Apartheid was not an ordinary conflict in the usual sense of that word, or in 
the usual sense in which the term “conflict” is understood.  In South Africa, 
colonialism laid the foundation for apartheid.  Long before the National Party 
came to power, the colonial project had already created latent “conflict” in South 
Africa through laws and policies that dispensed social and economic benefits to 
the White minority while disenfranchising the Black population. It is important to 
emphasize this point because it underscores what transitional justice means—and 
should mean—in the South African context and why the transitional justice in 
South Africa cannot be the same as in a classical post-conflict or a “victor’s 
justice” situation. 
The law, as an instrument of social engineering, became the most powerful 
instrument for the colonialist, and subsequently, the apartheid state.  Through the 
enactment of various laws, including the Natives Land Act,14 the Black 
Administration Act,15 and the Group Areas Act,16 apartheid literally confined the 
African population to the margins of socioeconomic opportunity.  The policy of 
Bantustan education was designed by the apartheid regime to create a Black labor 
force educated enough to be exploited in the service of the system, but not 
sufficiently endowed to aspire to any career advancement beyond the lowest 
echelons.  As Thomas Bundschuh argues, since law was used to orchestrate these 
historical injustices, law will also be required to address them.17 
The nature of the “conflict” created by the structural disenfranchisement of 
Blacks by apartheid is such that the consequences are still very visible across 
South Africa twenty-two years after the fall of apartheid.  Recent statistics 
indicate that Black South Africans still occupy the bottom rung in the socio-
economic ladder.  For example, according to a survey conducted by Statistics 
South Africa on poverty trends between 2006 and 2011, nine out of ten poor 
South Africans were Black, representing an increase from 92.9% in 2006 to 
 
13 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 5 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
14 Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 (S. Afr.) (repealed 1991) (dispossessing Blacks of their land and 
forbidding them from owning land outside areas demarcated by the legislation.). 
15 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (S. Afr.) (repealed 2006) (creating a different system of 
administration under which Blacks received inferior services.). 
16 Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (S. Afr.) (repealed 1957) (confining Blacks to certain geographical 
areas). 
17 See Thomas Bundschuh, Enabling Transitional Justice, Restoring Capabilities: The Imperative of 
Participation and Normative Integrity, 9 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST.10, 11 (2015). 
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94.2% in 2011.18  This figure is the highest amongst the different racial groups in 
South Africa.19 
The outcomes are comparable when using other indices such as household 
income and poverty levels.20  The survey, however, also shows that the overall 
poverty levels amongst Black South Africans fell from 66.8% in 2006 to 54.0% in 
2011.21  According to the 2014 figures, unemployment amongst Black South 
Africans stood at 40%, again the highest, compared to 28% among Coloured, 
18% among Indians and 8% among Whites.22 
One finds similar results using other indices of measurement—access to land 
and other means of production; access to adequate housing, healthcare, and higher 
education; and participation and representation in senior management positions in 
corporate South Africa or academia.  While these statistics may not be 
unexpected given the limited time period under review, there are signs of social 
disquiet that cannot be ignored.  The discontent arising from this lack of progress 
has generated widespread protests across the country in recent years.23 
Contrary to the dominant narrative, the slow pace of transformation is not 
necessarily for want of trying by successive administrations since 1994, nor is it 
the case that the time is too short to expect any remarkable improvement in the 
socioeconomic transformation of South Africa.  Rather, the explanation for the 
current state of affairs lies in the nature of South Africa’s transition.  The lack of 
pace in transformation has been compounded by the appointment of ANC cadres 
that have limited management capacity.  A sound plan for capacity development 
and training of managers has not been prioritized from the outset.  As Patrick 
Bond explains, societies that embarked on the South Africa-style transition have 
remained volatile and unstable, which one critic labeled “choiceless 
democracy.”24  Consequently, there is an urgent need to recalibrate the normative 
agenda and shift the paradigm, both at the national and—indeed—international 
levels, from one that seeks transitional process without a transformative change to 
a praxis of “transformative justice”25 capable of addressing the kind of “conflict” 
a society like South Africa has undergone.  This approach should have the 
capacity to address the “structural and everyday violence” through transformative 
 
18 STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA, POVERTY TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN EVALUATION OF ABSOLUTE 
POVERTY BETWEEN 2006 AND 2011, at 27 (2014), http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-
06/Report-03-10-06March2014.pdf. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. at 40–43. 
21 Id. at 27. 
22 Statistics South Africa, Presentation on Employment, Unemployment, Skills and Economic 
Growth: An Exploration of Household Survey Evidence on Skills Development and Unemployment 
Between 1994 and 2014, at slide 32 (2014), http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-
06/Report-03-10-06March2014.pdf. 
23 Laura Grant, Research Shows Sharp Increase in Service Delivery Protests, MAIL & GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 12, 2014), http://www.mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-increase-in-service-
delivery-protests); see also Johan Burger, The Reasons Behind Service Delivery Protests in South Africa, 
INSTITUTE OF SECURITY STUDIES (July 29, 2009), http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-reasons-behind-
service-delivery-protests-in-south-africa.  
24 Patrick Bond, Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa’s Elite Transition, 60 
J. OF INT’L AFF. 141, 142 (2006). 
25 Paul Gready & Simon Robins, From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice, 8 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 339, 340 (2014). 
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justice that “emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process 
rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and 
intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and 
the global level.”26  This objective cannot be achieved without mainstreaming 
socioeconomic rights in the process. 
A key aspect of this agenda must be to staunch the hemorrhaging of state 
funds.  Auditor-General Kimi Makwetu reported that, in the 2013-2014 period, 
R62.7 billion worth of irregular expenditure was incurred and unauthorized 
expenditures totaled R2.6 billion—up from R2.3 billion the previous year.  “And 
the bad news is that the worst government offenders, in terms of audits, are the 
departments arguably in charge of the most essential public services:  health, 
education, human settlements and public works.  Those departments have ‘largely 
failed the audit test’. . . .”27  A state-driven anti-corruption drive, together with 
training for government officials on fiscal responsibility, should be part of the 
policy for all public administration. 
The historical genesis of international human rights is largely responsible for 
categories of human rights that emerged with civil and political rights supposedly 
sitting at the top of the hierarchical order.28  Therefore, it is understandable that 
transitional justice has traditionally focused on civil and political rights—as the 
idea of orthodox “justice” has been associated with excluding socioeconomic 
justice—mimicking the primordial notion of human rights as excluding 
economic, social, and cultural rights.29 
Despite accepting the imperative of correcting the underlying socioeconomic 
rights violations that led to conflicts in transitional societies in the first place, 
some authors still question the place and efficacy of socioeconomic rights tools in 
transitional justice processes.30  Lars Waldof, for example, is “wary of efforts to 
have transitional justice tackle historically constructed socio-economic 
inequalities” and would be comfortable to have legal reform permitting the courts 
to intervene.31  Indeed, South Africa has such a legal system that permits the 
justiciability of socioeconomic rights—and some inroads have been made in this 
regard.  The main argument against the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in 
transitional justice mechanisms and processes is imbalanced and only pays 
attention to the challenges that such a decision might face.  That argument 
completely ignores that the consequences of the alternative—which is to leave 
socioeconomic injustices unaddressed—are arguably worse in some cases. 
 
26 Id. 
27 Rebecca Davis, 2014 Auditor-General report: Improvements, but massive wastage, DAILY 
MAVERICK (Nov. 27, 2014), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-11-27-2014-auditor-general-
report-improvements-but-massive-wastage/#.WGaqAVzkqAU. 
28 VINODH JAICHAND, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 51 (Azizur 
Rahman Chowdhury & Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan eds., 2010). 
29 Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice For Societies in Transition, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1, 5 (2008). 
30 See, John Corntassel & Cindy Holder, Who is Sorry Now? Government Apologies, Truth 
Commissions, and Indigenous Self-Determination in Australia, Canada, Guatemala and Peru, 9 HUM. RTS. 
REV. 465 (2008). 
31 Lars Waldof, Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs, 21(2) SOC. 
& LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2012). 
18 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 7:1 
 
Another rationale for excluding socioeconomic rights, the argument goes, is 
that “existing [transitional justice] mechanisms are already overcharged, their 
responsibilities too heavy, public expectations too unrealistic and finances already 
too lean.”32  This argument is reminiscent of—and could well be borne of—the 
abhorrence for economic, social, and cultural rights in mainstream human rights 
discourse.33  Current transitional justice mechanisms are too narrow because they 
focus only on retributive justice of uncovering the truth, holding perpetrators—
which, in most cases, are only a handful—accountable, and facilitating 
institutional reforms that guarantee civil and political rights to avoid the 
recurrence of abuses of the past.34 
Most transitional justice processes, even in the best of circumstances, have 
never been able to accomplish the minimum expectations of accountability 
promised for the victims.35  Nor is there a universal frame of reference for what 
those expectations are.36  What we find in most cases in transitional justice 
mechanisms is that victims of past abuses demand processes that would enable 
them to transcend that through socioeconomic incapacitation.  In underscoring the 
imperative of this task, Rama Mani believes that transitional justice. 
 
[W]ill lose credibility in the predominantly impoverished and 
devastated societies where it operates if these questions are not 
urgently and meaningfully addressed by practitioners and 
scholars.  Conversely, efforts to find appropriate responses to 
these challenges could contribute greatly to the positive impact 
[transitional justice] mechanisms have on the lives of survivors 
and on the chances for a stable transition from conflict to 
peace.37 
 
This is underscored in the case of South Africa where the system of apartheid 
was rooted primarily not just in the violation of civil and political rights, but even 
more in the economic deprivation and exclusion from the life of the state.  Louse 
Arbour summarizes this in the following language: 
 
Transitional justice must have the ambition to assist the 
transformation of oppressed societies into free ones by 
addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will 
procure equitable future.  It must reach to—but also beyond—
the crimes and abuses committed during the conflict that led to 
 
32 Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between 
Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253, 255 (2008). 
33 See generally AMARTYA SEN, supra note 13.  For example, Amartya Sen argues that the “liberty of 
political participation or the opportunity to receive basic education or health care . . . are among the 
constituent components of development . . . [and] these freedoms and rights are also very in contributing to 
economic progress.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
34 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice On Conflict and Post 
Conflict Societies, Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
35 See van Zyl, supra note 5, at 653. 
36 Id. 
37 Mani, supra note 32, at 254. 
2017 Jaichand: In Transition? The Struggle for Socio-Economic Justice in South Africa 19 
 
the transition, and it must address the human rights violations 
that pre-dated the conflict and caused or contributed to it.38 
 
So, even if other societies in transition that have undergone what might be 
described as “conventional” conflict can hope to achieve socioeconomic justice 
through the process of development, South Africa stands a limited chance 
because of the very nature of apartheid.  Apartheid policies did not just exclude 
the Black majority from economic development; they went further to seize from 
them the major means of production—land. 
In many societies, socioeconomic grievances were underlying causes and 
civil and political39 factors were immediate or trigger factors of the conflict.  In 
the case of apartheid, the reverse was true.  The only agendum was economic 
subjugation and dispossession.  It was the end.  Political exclusion was merely the 
means to that end.  Therefore, any transitional justice mechanism in the South 
African context that merely addresses civil and political rights violations—
without addressing economic, social, and cultural rights abuses—not only ignores 
the single most permanent destructive dimension of violence suffered by the 
victims of “conflict” under apartheid, but also actually prepares the country for 
another round of cataclysmic upheaval.  To be viable and sustainable, the process 
must, among other things, address the “interpersonal and structural” violations 
brought about by the past regime.40 
Even the United Nations seems to have reached this conclusion when it 
acknowledged that “[p]eace can only prevail if issues such as systematic 
discrimination, unequal distribution of wealth and social services, and endemic 
corruption can be addressed in a legitimate and fair manner by trusted public 
institutions.”41  Even more recently, it acknowledged the fact that the 
development of transitional justice practice has been greatly influenced by civil 
and political rights discourse to the exclusion of economic, social, and cultural 
rights.42  “[T]ransitional justice can contribute to the fight against impunity for 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights, and to their prevention, by 
laying the foundations for forward-looking reforms and agendas.”43 
On the South African transitional justice process, Ben Okri rhetorically 
asked, “Has there been a reconciliation without proper consideration?”44  Perhaps.  
 
38 See Arbour, supra note 29, at 3. 
39 See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Transitional Justice and Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, HR/PUB/13/5, 6 (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-13-
05.pdf. 
40 Gready & Robins, supra note 25, at 344. 
41 U.N. Secretary-General, GUIDANCE NOTE: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, 7 
(Mar. 2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf.  
42 See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 39, at 6. 
43 Id.; see also U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 41, at 7 (Paragraph 9 of the note states, “Violations 
of economic, social, and cultural rights not only exacerbate or spark civil or political tensions resulting in 
conflict or repressions, but conflict or repression often precipitate further violations of these rights.  
Successful strategic approaches to transitional justice necessitate taking account of the root causes of 
conflict or repressive rule, and must seek to address the related violations of all rights, including economic, 
social, and cultural rights (e.g., loss or deprivation of property rights).”). 
44 Ben Okri, Biko: The Tough Alchemy of Africa, Address at 13th annual Steve Biko Memorial 
Lecture (Sept. 12, 2012), in CAPE TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/full-speech-ben-
okri-honours-biko-1.1382746#.VdncM7ew9sM. 
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The one area in which this truth still needs to be told today is the aspect of 
socioeconomic inequalities in South Africa in which the legacy of apartheid is 
most visible.  Structurally orchestrated socioeconomic disenfranchisement, 
deprivation, and dispossession of the means of production—such as land—and 
the denial of equal opportunity to participate in the social and economic life of the 
country was acknowledged—but unfortunately sidestepped—by the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.45  Hence, while seeking redress 
for civil and political rights violations of the apartheid government—and long 
before mainstream transitional justice scholars and practitioners began to turn to 
economic, social, and cultural rights as components of transitional justice 
processes—activists had pressured the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to include violations of those rights in the scope of its work.46  But 
these were not accepted in the victims’ hearings by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the following text from the Commission’s Report confirms this: 
 
The Commission recognised that these issues formed part of the 
broader context within which the specifically defined gross 
human rights violations had taken place.  It sought to give 
attention to them by receiving submissions from a number of 
organisations that had been particularly concerned with these 
issues in the past.  These submissions made a valuable 
contribution to the section of the final report dealing with the 
broad context within which the gross violations of human rights 
took place, although they could not be considered as victim 
hearings.  They gave depth to the larger picture, but they still 
excluded individuals from recognition and from access to 
reparations, and many people remained aggrieved.47 
 
If indeed in 1994 it seemed that the enjoyment of civil and political rights 
would over time make the demands for socioeconomic justice vanish, the series 
of “service delivery” protests have proved such expectations to be misplaced.  
These are not matters of “service delivery” but violations of the socioeconomic 
rights by “organs of the state.”48  Therefore, the state is complicit in the violation 
of human rights when it fails to implement the socioeconomic rights promised in 
the constitution.  The apartheid regime created opportunities for only an exclusive 
section of society while concurrently depriving others—sentencing them to a 
vicious cycle of poverty from which they can only escape through structural 
reforms.49  The current practices only exacerbate the existing deprivations.  
Perhaps the appointment of a Minister of Reconciliation and Transformation in 
South Africa, tasked with holistically addressing these fundamental human rights 
violations might have combatted this void—arising from the pernicious practice 
 
45 See Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, supra note 7, at 11. 
46 See id. 
47 Id. 
48 CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR., 1996 § 8(1). 
49 See generally Gready & Robins, supra note 25. 
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of apartheid since the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
published.  It can be said that even if such a minister was appointed today, it 
would not be too late for some sagacious thinking and implementation on the part 
of the government. 
Time and again, economic and social goods such as housing, health care, 
education, and so on continue to dominate the list of demands of victims; not just 
in the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa alone, 
but also in other transitional justice systems.50  These, and a host of other 
demands, cannot be addressed on a sustainable basis through short-term 
reparation programs for individual victims, but require a long-term plan..51  
Instead of the socioeconomic rights the victims hoped for, however, they receive 
some legal assurances through constitutional reforms that their rights would never 
again be violated in the manner they had been in the past. Historically constructed 
structural inequalities will not disappear merely because there has been a transfer 
of political power from the oppressive regime to a popularly elected 
government.52 
The racial tolerance and social cohesion South Africa sought through the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission will continue to remain elusive so long as 
the vast majority of the victims of historical, social, and economic injustices feel 
their conditions are no better than they were before.  While it is important to 
subject the implementation of the different programs in the transition mechanisms 
to public scrutiny, it is equally as detrimental to try to deny the conditions that 
made the policy necessary initially, because it is a first step toward discrediting 
the very notion of socioeconomic rights as necessary tools for societies in 
transition.  
 
 
II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
By the 1980s, it had become clear to the apartheid regime that the repressive 
strategy that underpinned apartheid policies was unsustainable and that it could 
no longer ignore the international isolation and the myriad of sanctions imposed 
by the international community.  At the same time, the liberation movement had 
not been able to defeat the apartheid regime despite the armed struggle and 
escalation in the intensity of the conflict.53  Given the circumstances, a deadlock-
breaking mechanism—in which both sides to the conflict would be 
accommodated—had to be negotiated.  Amongst other things, and for a variety of 
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reasons, the transition process had to guarantee amnesty to functionaries and 
operatives of the apartheid government in exchange for full disclosures and 
confessions before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as part of a 
transitional justice process.  Thus, one of the mandates of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was the “granting of amnesty to persons who make 
full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political 
objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.”54  This was the 
atmosphere in which the South African transition process was negotiated, and it 
has arguably impacted how the transition process has since played out.  
During the constitutional negotiation of a post-apartheid South Africa, there 
was a subtle struggle between the “leftists” in the African National Congress—
whose Freedom Charter had been heavily influenced by the contents of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—and the group 
whose economics and politics were based on neoliberalism.  To all that were 
watching, it appeared as if the lure of political power was more attractive to the 
African National Congress than a clear economic policy.  A compromise had to 
be reached to retain the neoliberal political economy of the new South Africa, but 
it was tempered by selected principles of socioeconomic rights that were then 
incorporated in the constitution to guarantee a modicum of social justice.55 
Based on the contents of the Freedom Charter as its fundamental document, 
many in the liberation struggle—and the anti-apartheid movement-- hoped to see 
a South Africa that would pursue social justice as an end, using the state 
apparatus constructed on the political economy of a developmental state model.56  
Although they thought they had ensured victory by including the protection of 
socioeconomic rights in Section 26 of the Constitution, South Africans have been 
disappointed to realize that “economics and law [have] evolved though different 
pathways” since the end of apartheid.57  Naomi Klein describes this as “a process 
of infantilization that is common to so-called transitional countries—new 
governments are, in effect, given the keys to the house but not the combination to 
the safe.”58 The South African Constitution has recognized socioeconomic rights 
as being justiciable: this has been elaborated by the Constitutional Court through 
world-acclaimed socioeconomic rights jurisprudence.  In fact, the South African 
state has merely surrendered to neoliberalism and is incapable of transitioning 
constitutional mandates into reality without risking confrontation with global 
capital.59 
Beyond constitutional recognition of socioeconomic rights and the radical 
approach of the Constitutional Court to constantly challenge the interface of law 
and economics, neoliberalism has trumped social justice and socioeconomic 
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rights have made limited inroads.60  Coupled with highly inefficient 
administrative and management personnel, efforts to redress historical injustices, 
poverty, and inequality have been largely unsuccessful.   There are some who 
would argue that the government has the necessary enabling laws in the 
Constitution and other legislative frameworks to redress structural inequalities, 
such as the Restitution of Land Rights Act,61 the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act,62 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act,63 amongst others. 
No other issue of social and economic inequality in South Africa is as vexing 
as the land reform question.  As James Gibson rightly observes, “South Africa’s 
past is now colliding with its present”64 and “threatens its future because of the 
unresolved land issues.”65  James Gibson further argues that land reconciliation 
brings into sharp focus the clash between legality and justice and involves 
resolving the “clash of rights.”66  The future of South Africa will depend, to a 
large extent, on how it negotiates the nuances and resolves these issues.  Because 
of the non-implementation of the constitutional principles on compensation and 
very poor management in the last twenty-two years, the response of the 
government on matters of acquisition of land for land reform and restitution may 
be characterized as unclear.  Now the government has to scramble to come up 
with plausible policies to counter the threats of populist land occupation. 
So, in one view, if the government is not utilizing these transformative laws 
effectively to deliver social justice, this is a dilemma that the government must 
resolve.  At some stage, the electorate will have to indicate their displeasure and 
vote in a government who can deliver the promises inherent in the constitution. 
Two recent events in South Africa disprove this reductionist approach and 
underscore the triumph of neoliberalism over the attempts to ingrain social justice 
through the weaving of socioeconomic rights into the Constitution. 
First, in 2008, eight years after the Constitutional Court had declared that 
Irene Grootboom and her children were entitled to a decent house, she died in a 
shack dwelling.67  She had not received that decent house by the time of her 
death.68  The Court found that Ms. Grootbroom and her family’s right to access 
adequate housing was violated.69  Not even a Constitutional Court decision could 
manifest a house for her.  In his book, Justice Sachs recounts the case:  “[T]he 
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fact that her family was not yet housed in reasonable accommodation showed 
how difficult it was to realize the socio-economic rights in the Constitution.”70  A 
more nuanced view might be that the case was a missed opportunity to calibrate a 
judicial decision on socioeconomic rights with the appropriate executive and 
management response. 
Second, in August 2012, thirty-four miners were shot dead by policemen in 
Marikana71—the largest number of people killed by the state since the Sharpeville 
incident in 1960.72  The circumstances surrounding the miners’ deaths are 
unclear; the dominant view, however, is that they were shot and killed because 
they were demanding a living wage.73  After a report on the killings was issued,74 
one journalist made the following comment, “No one has ever claimed 
responsibility for the Marikana massacre, even though several of the shootings 
were captured in real-time by television cameras.  The victims were striking 
mineworkers, employed by Lonmin, a British platinum-mining company; those 
firing the guns were policemen, employed by the South African state.”75 
These two cases illustrate that the rights of the poor are not being prioritized 
and that they continue to bear the brunt.  There is a need to adopt a holistic 
approach to socioeconomic rights and deal with it as a structural problem that 
requires a systemic solution.76 
Without trying to justify acts of xenophobia, twice in the past twenty-two 
years—in 2008 and 2015—some South Africans have unleashed barbaric 
violence on vulnerable foreigners perceived to be taking their jobs or other 
economic opportunities.77  These perceptions were confirmed in a report by Navi 
Pillay, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and chair of the Special 
Reference Group on Migration and Community Integration in KwaZulu-Natal.  
One conclusion of that report was that poverty‚ socioeconomic inequality, and 
unemployment heightened tensions within and between many communities.78  
The likelihood of further recurrences cannot be discounted. 
Finally, the rise in student protests in 2015 surrounding the cost of and access 
to higher education may be attributed to the impatience surrounding 
empowerment and economic opportunity.  It is without doubt a right-to-education 
issue.  As in 1976, students are calling for a transformation; this time, they are 
calling for the transformation of the culture and curricula of historically white 
 
70 ALBIE SACHS, THE STRANGE ALCHEMY OF LIFE AND LAW 274 (2009). 
71 See Marikana Commissionn of Inquiry: Report on Matters on Public, National and International 
Concern Arising Out of the Tragic Incidents at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana, in the North West Province 
(Mar. 2015) (S. Afr.), http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/marikana-report-1.pdf. 
72 See Alex Perry, South Africa’s Police Open Fire on Striking Miners: The Video, TIME (Aug. 16, 
2012), http://world.time.com/2012/08/16/south-africas-police-open-fire-on-striking-miners-the-video/ (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
73 See id., at 49–50. 
74 Id. 
75 Jack Shenker, The Marikana Report Has Brought No Justice and No Relief, THE GUARDIAN (July 
3, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/03/marikana-massacre-justice-south-
africa-miners. 
76 See Bond, supra note 24, at 141. 
77 Report Blames Media for Xenophobic Panic in SA, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/report-blames-media-for-xenophobic-panic-in-sa-20160406. 
78 Id. 
2017 Jaichand: In Transition? The Struggle for Socio-Economic Justice in South Africa 25 
 
universities,79 the removal of colonial thinking from their education,80 and the fair 
opportunity for workers on the campuses who were outsourced to private 
companies.81 The deferral of the promise of socioeconomic rights and their 
implementation are highlighted in these protests. 
The current paradigm of transitional justice still views the state as a mere 
facilitator in social transformation through economic and social rights.  In the 
case of South Africa, the facilitator is the very same state that was once the 
violator of these rights.  There should be a shift in this paradigm to mainstream 
socioeconomic rights with the state serving as the duty-bearer—just as in cases of 
civil and political rights violations.  The Grootboom case challenges this apparent 
effectiveness and illustrates the limitation of judicial intervention in social 
transformation because it “questions the power of law when political economy 
does not want to help.”82  To expect constitutional litigation to solve this 
imbalance is unrealistic because the progress is slow and determined on a case-
by-case basis.  Instead more executive action is required. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
South Africa is a country still in transition, even with the assistance of the 
work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  Alexander Boraine views 
transition as a passing or passage from one condition, action, or—rarely—place to 
another.  “It is a journey—never short—often precarious.”83  For South Africa, 
twenty-two years after the end of apartheid, some contend that the transition was 
not a success—as though the transition had ended.  While this might be a moment 
for us to pause and reflect on the transition, it would be too soon to conclude that 
it is a fait accompli. 
At the same time the outcomes in the Grootboom case, the Marikana killings, 
and the two incidents of serious xenophobia may not be as disconnected as they 
appear to be at first sight.  Even more, there are also the angry student protests 
that have resulted in burning of campus facilities.  More importantly, are the cases 
indicators of something more precarious in South Africa’s transition from 
apartheid to democracy?  The short answer might be that it is all too early to 
conclude. 
Perhaps, it is in recognition of the fact that the transition has not ended that 
Cath Collins speaks of “Post-Transitional Justice” as a distinct frame for analysis 
that will examine the all-inclusiveness and adequacy of the early concessions 
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made in the transitional justice process.84  South Africa continues to witness 
widespread poverty and inequality.  Political freedom for all arrived with 
democracy in 1994, but the economic power continues to lie in the hands of the 
group who were the beneficiaries of the previous order. 
A great danger lies ahead if either the attempt to undermine the role of 
socioeconomic rights in the transition process succeeds or the implementation of 
such rights as components of the transition process fails.  Political participation 
and a guarantee of civil and political rights are usually ineffective firewalls 
against the violent consequences of socioeconomic exclusion.  Without taking a 
programmatic approach to addressing socioeconomic deficits—perhaps through 
the appointment of a Minister of Reconciliation and Transformation backed by 
effective implementation of socioeconomic rights—no assessment can be made of 
when any transition has ended, if it has at all. 
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